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Evaluation of health care in developing countries from a Western perspective is masking the failures
of market based reforms
Health reforms based on market principles have been
introduced widely in both developed and developing
countries over the past 20 years. In developing
countries, international donors have insisted on health
reform as a precondition of providing external aid.
The reform packages that have been introduced have
been strikingly similar across countries as wide apart as
Uganda, Bolivia, and Russia. Uganda embarked on
market based health reforms in 1994. These reforms
have not only failed to improve health services and the
health of the population but have arguably been the
key factor behind their deterioration. What can we
learn from Uganda’s experience?
Health sector reforms in Uganda
Uganda introduced health sector reforms, defined by
the World Bank as market reforms, in 1994.1 The
reforms were based on four cardinal market principles2:
x Individuals, charities, and private organisations
should be made responsible for health care
x Public funding of health care should be restricted to
health promotion and prevention of disease
x Central government’s role should be restricted to
policy formulation and technical guidance, with deliv-
ery of services left to the private sector and local
authorities
x The private sector and non-governmental organisa-
tions should be supported to become the key providers
of health and social services.1
In accordance with these principles, the central
Ministry of Health abdicated service provision to local
authorities and individuals. The idea was that people
should be enabled to take responsibility for their own
health through economic growth, which would lead to
better household incomes and allow people to buy
health care from privately owned health facilities.
But although Uganda’s decentralisation has been
praised, it has introduced major obstacles to service
provision. This is because most of the funds distributed
to districts have been earmarked by donors and the
Ministry of Health for a specific use. The district health
authorities have had to use the funds as directed and
not been allowed to deploy them to meet local needs.
As a result specific local priorities are often not
addressed. Decentralisation has actually widened
disparities in the nature and quality of health services.
For example, the availability of emergency obstetric
services now varies from 4% to 42%.3 This is because
the richer districts and those with powerful local politi-
cians who have been able to persuade non-
governmental organisations to work in their district
have done better. Immunisation has improved fairly
uniformly in all districts, but this is unique.4
Other organisational reforms that were introduced
included granting hospitals greater autonomy and
encouraging the formation of public-private partner-
ships. The Ministry of Health was restructured as part
of civil service reform and non-governmental organi-
sations given a mandate to become more involved in
provision and delivery of health services.
User fees
User fees were introduced as one of the key methods to
finance the health reforms. The first formal attempt to
introduce user fees failed in 1990, which led to fees
being charged illegally on an ad hoc basis by health
workers. In 1993, user fees were universally introduced
as a condition for getting a World Bank loan.
User fees were expected to generate resources, pro-
mote efficient use of these resources, and improve the
quality and equity of health services. Unfortunately, this
did not materialise. The funds generated were typically
less than 5% of total expenditure for most hospitals
and health districts and they had little or no effect on
the quality or efficiency of services. Furthermore, their
introduction was associated with a dramatic drop in
take up of health services.5 User fees were abolished in
2001, largely in response to the findings of the World
Bank’s first Participatory Poverty Assessment Report
(1999), which sparked an outcry about lack of access to
health care and deteriorating standards of care.6 A
definitive study that proved fees had not achieved their
aim was published in 2004.7
The government set an unrealistically low ceiling
on health and social welfare expenditure. For example,
a realistic annual budget for a large teaching hospital
in 1996 was 30bn shillings (£10m, $17m, €13m) but the
ceiling was set at 12.26bn in 1996, 8.87bn in 1997, and
13.28bn in 1999. Given the rise in inflation over this
time, expenditure on health services (particularly on
hospitals) was effectively held constant8 and yet the
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Effect of the reforms
Official reports of the effect of health sector reform in
Uganda, typically written by donor funded expatriate
staff, have tended to paint a rosy picture. But the reality
has often been and remains shockingly different.
Although macroeconomic targets for an inflation
rate of 5.7% and economic growth of 7% a year have
been attained during 1987-2004, Uganda has failed to
achieve a functioning health system. Performance of
health services fell after the introduction of the reforms
(table 1) and key health statistics from 1990-1995 to
2000 -2004 have got worse (table 2). Important health
and development targets such as the millennium
development goals that cannot be achieved within the
social spending ceilings have now been abandoned.8
Although access to health services is said to have
increased as a result of the growth in private clinics,
socioeconomic inequality within Uganda has grown
and the poor, who make up the majority of the popu-
lation, have become worse off.10 11 Fixed funding of
hospitals has not made it possible to increase staffing
or provide the extra drugs and equipment needed to
treat the growing population. Inequity in provisions of
health services has increased in parallel with rising
economic differentials; income inequality has wors-
ened from a Gini coefficient (a measure of equity
where 0 is perfect equity and 1 is perfect inequality) of
0.35 in 1992 to 0.45 in 2003.11
Both consumer assessed and technical quality of
health care have fallen to 30% or less.12 13 In participa-
tory poverty assessments (studies commissioned by the
World Bank to hear what poor people have to say
about poverty) carried out in 1999, 2002, and 2004,
most people expressed dissatisfaction with health care,
asserting that it is getting worse.4 A recent survey of
emergency obstetric facilities in Uganda, which typifies
the entire health sector, indicates that technical
efficiency (extent to which medical inputs and
procedures conform to minimum standards) among
health facilities ranged from 3.9% to 41%.3
Healthcare outputs are also more expensive than
they used to be.5 Thus the reforms have not increased
efficiency. Nor have they reduced reliance on external
support. Currently, over 50% of Uganda’s health sector
spending comes from external aid. Re-establishment
of a functioning healthcare system will require heavy
investment in infrastructure, which means more
dependence on outsiders not less. Thus, in all aspects
of health sector performance, the picture is of failure.
Partisan interpretation
The World Bank and other institutions that advocate
market style healthcare reforms typically emphasise
the success of the organisational change and
understate their adverse effects on health and social
welfare. For example, increasing global life expectancy
is cited as evidence of improved global health and wel-
fare.14 15 Poverty, it is claimed, has been reducing, and
inequity does not exist (if equity is the same as equal
opportunity).15 16 When inequity is acknowledged, it is
portrayed as necessary for economic growth and social
mobility.17
In Uganda, both the justification for, and the effect
of, market based health reform has been questionable.
Poverty, which should include lack of access to basic
social services, has become synonymous with income
poverty, which is said to have reduced.11 Yet access to
basic health care and the quality of services have
largely remained low or even worsened (table 1).
Ministry staff and expatriate technical advisers have
cited the reduced prevalence of HIV and AIDS (from
30% in 1990s to 4.1% 2004)18 and the increased use of
outpatient services as evidence for the effectiveness of
health sector reforms. Yet the reduction in HIV and
AIDS was due to a political strategy of openness and
massive public education; it had little to do with health
sector reforms. The doubling of outpatient attendance
was due to the abolition of user fees not their
inception.
Increasingly, donor governments in the West
demand to see clear benefits from the external aid they
provide. To meet this demand technical advisers now
use short term surrogate output indicators such as the
number of health related radio messages broadcast, the
number of health workers trained, the level of the
budget funded, and the availability of district health
plans. This effectively hides the reality of massive
failures in health and social welfare.
Some would like to blame the poor health and
social welfare status of the majority of the population
in Uganda on AIDS and the war. But arguably these
cannot account for the evident failure of individual
Table 1 Health sector performance in Uganda during reforms4
Aspect of
performance Expected outcome Actual outcome
Access Increased physical access; increased economic access Increased physical access through private sector.
Reduced economic access.
Equity Increased equity Reduced equity
Quality Increased technical quality, reduced consumer based quality Same or reduced overall quality of health services
Efficiency Increased output/outcome for a given input No evidence for better efficiency
Sustainability Increasing proportion of internal financing of public services Over 50% dependence on donors. More dependence on external support expected
Health status Improved nutrition and reduced mortality Persistently high mortality and childhood malnutrition
Table 2 Ugandan health status outcomes9
1990-1995 2000-2004
Nutrition (% of children with wasting) 6.2 7-8
Access to safe water (%) 39.4 53.8
Access to proper sanitation (%) 34 51
Infant mortality (deaths/1000) 81 (97)* 88 (100)*
Neonatal mortality (deaths/1000) 27 33.2
Malaria morbidity (%) 25 37
Diarrhoea (%) 17.7 17.8
Maternal mortality ratio (deaths/100 000 births) 506 505
Child mortality (deaths/1000) 147 151
Life expectancy (years) 50 47
% of deliveries in health facilities 38% 38%
Fertility rate (No of children) 7.4 6.9
*By indirect method.
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health reform strategies. Besides, the effect of AIDS on
infant mortality is not significant.19 Furthermore, other
countries that are also experiencing a protracted civil
war, such as Sri Lanka, have maintained good social
welfare through a non-market based health system.20
What can be learnt from the market
reform experience?
Several lessons can be learnt from the market reform
experiment. Firstly, market economic principles are
good for generating wealth but poor at improving
health and social welfare. Secondly, to carry out genu-
ine health sector reforms based on agreed health
objectives, the health reforms must be disentangled
from market based economic reforms. In particular,
governments must guarantee social security and
essential health services to all. This means macro-
economic variables should be manipulated to facilitate
the attainment of social welfare targets without
jeopardising economic growth. This is possible, as
countries such as Costa Rica and Sri Lanka have
shown.20
Thirdly, the market philosophy, which is based on
greed and the accumulation of profit, cannot be the
proper basis for maximising welfare. Instead, the prin-
ciples of solidarity and compassion should provide the
basis for social welfare. The study of how to achieve
maximum health within a given economy should be
developed as a separate discipline from market based
health economics, which is primarily concerned with
minimisation of spending. Fourthly, aid and technical
assistance to poor countries must be given and
managed in a way that ensures a positive effect on
health and social welfare. In the long run, poor
countries such as Uganda should adopt a universal
health and welfare framework, which they must
increasingly finance from internal sources. Lastly,
health and welfare must be assessed by using genuine
indicators that comprehensively measure the reality of
people’s lives.
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Commentary: the devil is in the detail
Martin McKee, Barbara McPake
Okuonzi argues that the introduction of market
reforms, into the Ugandan health system has been a
failure.1 However, health systems are extremely
complex and, as the debate about the British internal
market shows, attribution of cause and effect is far from
easy. The situation in Uganda is equally complex, with
reforms taking place against a background of regional
conflict, growing inequalities, and changes in other
sectors. Furthermore, while Okuonzi focuses on hospi-
tals, it is equally important to look at primary care,
which the Ugandan reforms have sought to
strengthen.
Can we gain insights about market reforms from
other low and middle income countries? It is
important to distinguish between reforms directed at
funding and those directed at delivery of care. Many
policies aimed at funding, such as user fees, increase
the economic burden on families. This can deter them
from seeking necessary care and increases the risk of
impoverishment from expenditure on catastrophic ill-
ness,2 as is now happening in China.w1
Summary points
Donor agencies increasingly require market based
health reforms before giving grants to developing
countries
In Uganda market reforms have not improved
health care
Inequity in access to health care has increased
and important health indicators have worsened
More emphasis needs to placed on social welfare
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